The latest installment.
Some questions and answers:
Q1. Where did the proposal allowing for secession after 10 years come from?
From the Muslim League proposals of May 12, 1946 (
here)
10.
The Constitution of the Union shall have a provision whereby any
Province can, by a majority vote of its Legislative Assembly, call for
reconsideration of the terms of the Constitution, and will have the
liberty to secede from the Union at any time after an initial period of
ten years.
The Cabinet Mission Plan statement of May 16, 1946 (
here) accomodated it as follows (also read answer to Q2)
(6) The Constitutions of the Union and of the groups should contain a
provision whereby any Province could by majority vote of its Legislative
Assembly could call for a reconsideration of the terms of the
Constitution after an initial period of ten years and at ten-yearly
intervals thereafter.
Q2. What was the Congress response to the above proposal?
From the same link above, the relevant points
a. from the Congress' proposals of May 12, 1946
8.
The Constitution should provide machinery for its revision at any time
subject to such checks as may be desired. If so desired, it may be
specifically stated that this whole Constitution may be reconsidered
after 10 years.
and
b. from the Congress response to Muslim League Proposals of May 12, 1946
(10) The Constitution of the Union will
inevitably contain provisions for its revision. It may also contain a
provision for its full reconsideration at the end of ten years. The
matter will be open then for a complete reconsideration. Though it is
implied, we would avoid reference to secession as we do not wish to
encourage this idea."
Q3. What would the strength of Muslims be in the proposed Central Legislature per the May 12 proposals?
The Muslim League: (
here)
6. There should be parity of representation between the
two groups of Provinces in the Union Executive and the Legislature, if
any.
7. No major point in the Union Constitution which affects
the communal issue shall be deemed to be passed in the joint
constitution-making body, unless the majority of the members of the
constitution-making body of the Hindu provinces and the majority of the
members of the constitution-making body of the Pakistan Group, present
and voting, are separately in its favour.
The Congress: (
here)
(6 and 7) We are entirely
opposed to parity of representation as between groups of Provinces in
the Union Executive or Legislature. We think that the provision to the
effect that no major communal issue in the Union Constitution shall be
deemed to be passed by the Constituent Assembly unless a majority of
the members of the community or communities concerned present and
voting in the Constituent Assembly are separately in its favour, is a
sufficient and ample safeguard of all Minorities.
We have
suggested something wider and including all communities than has been
proposed elsewhere. This may give rise to some difficulties in regard
to small communities, but all such difficulties can be got over by
reference to arbitration. We are prepared to consider the method of
giving effect to this principle so as to make it more feasible.
Q4. What did the Cabinet Mission Plan statement of May 16 say about the composition of a Central Legislature?
It did not say much. On the subject of the Central Legislature, here are the salient points:
(2) The Union should have an Executive and a Legislature constituted
from British Indian and States' representatives. Any question raising a
major communal issue in the Legislature should require for its decision a
majority of the representatives present and voting of each of the two
major communities as well as a majority of all members present and
voting.
Q5. Did Jinnah interpret the 10 year clause in the Cabinet Mission Plan as allowing for secession?
As per Jinnah's conversation with Major Woodrow Wyatt on May 24, 1946, Jinnah was upset that the Cabinet Mission Plan statement did not allow provinces to secede.
6. His general criticism of the Statement was that it had not
settled any of the fundamentals. For example:-
...
(d)
Provinces had not been given the right to secede after 10 years
although the Congress had always been willing to give the right to
secede and had raised no real objection this time at Simla.
Q6. Was Jinnah quite happy with the federal solution laid down by the Cabinet Mission Plan?
As per Jinnah's conversation with Major Woodrow Wyatt on May 24, 1946, this is what Jinnah thought:
3. He considered
that the Statement was not a practicable proposition. The machinery
envisaged would not work and could not work mainly because there was no
spirit of co-operation on the Congress side. The Mission had obviously
not even fully appreciated the situation in India. What was required
was a surgical operation. This Statement would settle nothing.....
5. He said that the preamble to the Mission's
Statement had bitterly hurt the feelings of the Muslims. Not only that,
it was inconsistent with the rest of the Statement. This onslaught was
quite unnecessary and had been done in order to placate Congress.
Indeed, the word Pakistan was an anathema throughout the Statement.
This preamble made matters even more difficult for him than before.
6. His general criticism of the Statement was that it had not
settled any of the fundamentals. For example:-
(a) The Muslim group of Provinces had not got parity with the
others at the centre.
(b)
There was no real protection for the Muslims in the Constituent
Assembly, because from the very start the chairman would be a Hindu,
unless the Muslims were to say that the election of the chairman was a
communal issue, in which case the Constituent Assembly would break down
straight away.
(c) The position of the States was left far too vague.
(d)
Provinces had not been given the right to secede after 10 years
although the Congress had always been willing to give the right to
secede and had raised no real objection this time at Simla.
(e) The
Union had been given the power to raise money. This was not a communal
issue and would inevitably lead to taxation from the Centre with other
subjects being added on the short list of the Union Government.
7.
He explained to the Viceroy why there should be entirely separate
Constituent Assemblies which only met together for the purpose of
deciding the structure of the Union Government.
He thought the
Viceroy had understood. This was a psychological matter and the Mission
had created a single Constituent Assembly working in three sections
only to please the Congress, ignoring Muslim feeling.
8. The only
real safeguard for the Muslims was parity between Federations. The
method of voting on communal issues would not work as there would
always be dispute as to what was a communal issue and what was not.
9.
He could not understand why the Muslim provinces had been split into
two groups. He agreed that it was something to have the groups at all
and without them he could not even have looked at the Scheme.
10.
He disliked the Advisory Committee on which the Muslims would be in a
minority, and as far as he could see would be unable to prevent the
Union Constituent Assembly incorporating its recommendations as a part
of the constitution of the Union Government, thus added another subject
to those dealt with by the Union Government.
11. He dilated at
considerable length on the attitude of Congress who had not conceded
anything during the Simla Conference and would never approach the
Constituent Assembly in a spirit of co-operation. They would aim the
whole time to use their majority to steam-roller the Muslim League and
sidetrack the provision as to safeguarding the Muslims on communal
issues. It was inconceivable that such a Constituent Assembly could
work at all.
12. He will not come down to Delhi until June 1st or
2nd. He can say nothing further until he has consulted the Muslim
League Working Committee and Council. He is being bombarded with
telegrams from his supporters protesting against the Statement and the
Muslim reaction is very strong against it. My own impression is that he
definitely wants to see where he is with the Muslim League before
giving a decision on the Statement and he wants them to have time in
which to absorb the two shocks which they have been given.
(a) His own letter agreeing to a Union Government
(b) The preamble to the Mission's Statement.
He
is particularly hurt that the Mission have seized on this
concession(which was an enormous one from his stand point) and have not
taken his offer as a whole. None of the provisos that went with it
have been accepted. I pointed out to him that everything that Congress
had asked for had not been accepted either but he did not seem
particularly convinced.
Q7. Does the conversation of Major Woodrow Wyatt and Jinnah on May 24, 1946 prove "...that Muslim League’s resolution was aimed at saving
face with its own constituents and did not have any serious
ramifications in terms of the federation that was envisaged under the
Cabinet Mission Plan, which Jinnah seemed to believe was workable"?
The answer to Q6 provides excerpts to this very conversation, which show that Jinnah did not believe the plan was workable. Second, there is nothing here about saving face:
13. I asked him, in view of the
foregoing, whether he thought that the Muslim League Working Committee
might possibly pass a resolution on the following lines:-
The
British had exceeded their brief in pronouncing on the merits of
Pakistan. They had no business to turn down what millions of people
wanted. Their analysis of Pakistan was outrageous. But the Muslims had
never expected the British to give them Pakistan. They had never
expected anyone to give them Pakistan. They knew they had to get it by
their own strong right arm.
The scheme outlined in the Cabinet
Mission's Statement was impracticable and could not work. But
nevertheless in order to show that they would give it a trial, although
they knew that the machinery could not function, they would accept the
Statement and would not go out of their way to sabotage the
procedure-but they would accept the
Statement as the first step on the
road to Pakistan.
At this proposition he
was delighted and said "That's it, you've got it", and I am completely
convinced that that is what the Muslim League will do.
14. He will demand parity in the Interim Government if he decides to
come into it.
PS: Jinnah's public statement of May 22, 1946 on the Cabinet Mission Plan has pretty much the same complaints that he reiterated to Major Wyatt on May 24 (answer to Q6 above).
PPS: As to the sincerity of the June 5-6 acceptance of the Cabinet Mission Plan by Jinnah,
also see this.
